Abstract. This paper presents an approach enabling a smart card issuer to verify that a new applet securely interacts with already downloaded applets. A security policy has been defined that associates levels to applet attributes and methods and defines authorized flows between levels. We propose a technique based on model checking to verify that actual information flows between applets are authorized. We illustrate our approach on applets involved in an electronic purse running on Java enabled smart cards.
Introduction
A new type of smart cards is getting more and more attractive: multiapplication smart cards. The main characteristics of such cards are that applications can be loaded after the card issuance and that several applications run on the same card. A few operating systems have been proposed to manage multiapplication smart cards, namely Java Card [22] , Multos [15] and more recently Windows for Smart Cards [14] . In this paper, we will focus on Java Card. Following this standard, applications for multiapplication smart cards are implemented as interacting Java applets.
Multiapplication smart cards involve several participants: the card provider, the card issuer that proposes the card to the users, application providers and card holders (users). The card issuer is usually considered responsible for the security of the card. The card issuer does not trust application providers: applets could be malicious or simply faulty.
As in a classical mobile code setting, a malicious downloaded applet could try to observe, alter, use information or resources it is not authorized to. Of course,
The Pacap project was partially funded by MENRT décision d'aide 98.B.0251 a set of JavaCard security functions were defined that severely restrict what an applet can do. But these functions do not cover a class of threats we call illicit applet interactions that cause unauthorized information flows between applets.
Our goal is to provide techniques and tools enabling the card issuer to verify that new applets interact securely with already loaded applets.
The first section introduces security concerns related to multiapplication smart cards. The second section of the paper describes the electronic purse functionalities and defines the threats associated with this application. The third section presents the security policy and information flow property we selected to verify that applets interact securely. The fourth section shows how we verify secure interaction properties on the applets byte code. The fifth section relates our approach to other existing work.
1 Security Concerns
Java Card security mechanisms
Security is always a big concern for smart cards but it is all the more important with multiapplication smart cards and post issuance code downloading.
Opposed to monoapplicative smart cards where Operating System and application were mixed, multiapplication smart cards have drawn a clear border between the operating system, the virtual machine and the applicative code. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish the security of the card (hardware, operating system and virtual machine) from the security of the application. The card issuer is responsible for the security of the card and the application provider is responsible for the applet security, which relies necessarily on the security of the card.
The physical security is obtained by the smart card media and its tamper resistance. The security properties that the OS guarantees are the quality of the cryptographic mechanisms (which should be leakage resistant, i.e. resistant against side channel attacks such Differential Power Analysis [11] ), the correctness of memory and I/O management.
A Java Card virtual machine relies on the type safety of the Java language to guarantee the innocuousness of an applet with respect to the OS, the virtual machine [12] , and the other applets. However this is guaranteed by a byte-code verifier which is not on board, so extra mechanisms have been added. A secure loader (like OP [24] ) checks before loading an applet that it has been signed by an authorized entity (namely the card issuer). Even if an unverified applet is successfully loaded on the card, the card firewall [23] , which is part of the virtual machine, will still deny to an aggressive applet the possibility to manipulate data outside its memory space.
To allow the development of multiapplication smart cards, the Java Card has introduced a new way for applets to interact directly. An applet can invoke another applet method through a shared interface. An applet can decide to share or not some data with a requesting applet based on its identifier.
Applets providers and end users security needs
Applet providers have numerous security requirements for their applications. Classical one are secret key confidentiality, protection from aggressive applets, integrity of highly sensitive data fields such as electronic purse balances, etc. These requirements are widely covered by the existing security mechanisms at various levels from silicon to secure loaders and are not covered in this paper. However, new security requirements appear with the growing complexity of applets and their ability to interact directly with other applets.
Particularly, application providers do not want information to flow freely inside the card. They want to be sure that the commercial information they provide such as marketing information and other valuable data (especially short term ones such as stock quotes, weather forecast and so on) will not be retransmitted by applets without their consent. For example, marketing information will be collected by a loyalty applet when an end user buys some goods at a retailer. This information will be shared with partner applets but certainly not with competitor applets. However it will certainly be the case that some partners applets will interact with competitor applets. As in the real world trust between providers should not be transitive and so should be the authorized information flows.
It is also expected that pay services inside the card, as information, will not be able to be re-sold by rogue applets. In a very constrained environment, services, even as little as an array sorting method can be valuable as they can help other applets to save precious non volatile memory space and thus money.
Finally, the end user security requirement will be related mainly with privacy. As soon as medical data or credit card record are handled by the card and transmitted between applets great care should be taken with the information flow ( [6] details such a privacy threat). Applet providers and end users cannot control that their information flow requirements are enforced on the card because they do not manage it. Our goal is to provide techniques and tools enabling the card issuer to verify that new applets respect existing security properties defined as authorized information flows. The approach is described on figure 1 .
Applet Certification
If the applet provider wants to load a new applet on a card, she provides the bytecode for this applet. The card issuer has a security policy for the card and security properties that must be satisfied. This security policy should take into account the requirements of applet providers and end users. We provide techniques and tools to decide whether the properties are satisfied by the new applet (these techniques are applied on the applet bytecode). If the properties hold, the applet can be loaded on the card; if they do not hold, it is rejected. A typical example of a multiapplication smart card is an electronic purse with one purse applet and two loyalty applets: a frequent flyer (Air France) application and a car rental (RentaCar) loyalty program. The purse applet manages debit and credit operations and keeps a log of all the transactions. When the card owner wants to subscribe to a loyalty program, the corresponding loyalty applet is loaded on the card. This applet must be able to interact with the purse to get to know the transactions made by the purse in order to update loyalty points according to these transactions. For instance, the Air France applet will add miles to the account of the card owner whenever an Air France ticket is bought with the purse. The card owner can use these miles to buy a discounted Air France ticket. Agreements may also exist between loyalty applets to allow exchanges of points. For instance, loyalty points granted by RentaCar could be summed with Air France miles to buy a discounted ticket.
Electronic Purse

Electronic Purse Functionalities
The electronic purse has been chosen as case study for our project. It has been implemented in Java by Gemplus.
Electronic Purse Threats
We suppose that all the relevant Java and JavaCard security functions are used in the electronic purse. But these functions do not cover all the threats. We are especially interested in threats particular to multiapplication smart cards like illicit applet interactions. An example of illicit interaction in the case of the electronic purse is described on figure 3. The purse applet has a shared interface for loyalty applets to get their transactions and the loyalty applet has a shared interface for partner loyalty applets to get loyalty points.
A "logFull" service is proposed by the purse to the loyalty applets: when the transaction log is full, the purse calls the logF ull method of the loyalty applets that subscribed to the service to warn them that the log is full and they should get the transactions before some of them are erased and replaced by new ones. We suppose the Air France applet subscribed to the logFull service, but the RentaCar applet did not. When the log is full, the purse calls the logF ull method of the Air France applet. In this method, the Air France applet gets transactions from the purse but also wants to update its extended balance that contains its points plus all the points it can get from its loyalty partners. To update this extended balance, it calls the getBalance method of the RentaCar loyalty applet. In that case, the car rental applet can guess that the log is full when the Air France applet calls its getBalance method and thus get the transactions from the purse. There is a leak of information from the Air France applet to the RentaCar one and we want to be able to detect such illicit information flows. This illicit behaviour would not be countered by the applet firewall as all the invoked methods belong to shared interfaces.
Multiapplication Security Policy
To implement the applet certification approach, we first have to choose a security policy adapted to multiapplication cards and associated security properties.
Security policy
We propose to use a multilevel security policy [6] that was designed for multiapplication smart cards. Each applet provider is assigned a security level and we consider special levels for shared data. On the example of the electronic purse, we have a level for each applet: AF for Air France, P for purse and RC for RentaCar and levels for shared data: AF + RC for data shared by Air France and RentaCar, AF + P for data shared by Air France and purse, etc. The relation between levels is used to authorize or forbid information flows between applets. In the policy we consider, AF + P AF and AF + P P , this means that information whose level is AF +P is authorized to flow towards information whose level is P or AF . So shared information from Air France and Purse may be received by Air France and Purse applets. To model that applets may only communicate through shared interfaces, direct flows between levels AF , P and RC are forbidden. So we have: AF P , P AF , AF RC, RC AF , P RC and RC P . The levels together with the relation have a lattice structure, so there are a bottom level public and a top level private. Figure 4 shows some of the authorized information flows. 
Security properties
Now we have to define the security properties to be enforced. We have chosen the secure dependency model [1] that applies to systems where applications might, maliciously or involuntarily, communicate confidential information to other applications. Like other information flow models such as non-interference [7] , this model ensures that dependencies between system objects cannot be exploited to establish an indirect communication channel. We apply this model to the electronic purse: illicit interactions will be detected by controlling the dependencies between objects of the system.
A program is described by a set of evolutions that associate a value with each object at each date. We note Ev ⊆ Objects × Dates → V alues the set of evolutions of a program. The set Objects × Dates is made of three disjoint subsets: input objects that are not computed by the program, output objects that are computed by the program and are directly observable and internal objects that are not observable. We assume that function lvl associates a security level with input and output objects.
The secure dependency property SecDep requires that the value of output objects with security level l only depends on the value of input objects whose security level is dominated by l:
This property cannot be directly proved with a model checker such as SMV [13] because it is neither a safety or liveness property nor a refinement property. So we look for sufficient conditions of SecDep that are better handled by SMV. By analysing the various instructions in a program, it is easy to compute for each object the set of objects it syntactically depends on. As we want to use model checkers to verify the security properties, it is important to restrict the size of value domains in order to avoid state explosions during verifications. To check security, it is sufficient to prove that the previous property holds in any state of an abstracted program where object values are replaced with object computed levels. If Ev is the set of evolution of the concrete program, then we note Ev a the set of evolutions of the corresponding abstract program. 
Applet Certification
An application is composed of a finite number of interacting applets. Each applet contains several methods. For efficiency reasons, we want to limit the number of applets and methods analysed when a new applet is downloaded or when the security policy is modified. We first present how we decompose the global analysis of interacting applets on a card into local verifications of a subset of the methods of one applet. Then we explain how the local verifications are implemented.
Global Analysis Technique
There are two related issues in order to be able to apply the approach in practice: we first have to determine what is the program we want to analyse (one method of one applet, all the methods in one applet, all the methods in all the applets on the card); then we have to identify inputs and outputs and to assign them a level.
We suppose the complete call graph of the application is given. Two kinds of methods will especially interest us because they are the basis of applet interactions: interface methods that can be called from other applets and methods that invoke external methods of other applets. We have decided to analyse subsets of the call graph that include such interaction methods. Furthermore an analysed subset only contains methods that belong to the same applet.
Let us consider for instance the Air France applet. Method logF ull is an interface method that calls two internal methods: askF orT ransactions and update. askF orT ransactions invokes method getT ransaction of Purse and credit the attribute balance with the value of the transactions; update invokes method getBalance of RentaCar and updates the value of the extendedbalance attribute. The program we are going to analyse is the set of 3 methods logF ull, askF orT ransactions and update.
Level Association. For a given program, we consider as inputs results from external invocations and read attributes. We take as outputs parameters of external invocations and modified attributes. We thus associate security levels with applet attributes and with method invocations between applets. By default, we associate level AF (resp. P and RC) with all the attributes of Air France (resp. Purse and RentaCar) applet. As Air France can invoke the getBalance or debit methods of RentaCar, we assign the shared security level RC + AF to these interactions. Similarly, as the Purse applet can invoke the logF ull method of Air France, we associate level AF + P with this interaction. And we associate level P + AF (resp. P + RC) with the invocation of getT ransaction method of the Purse applet by the Air France applet (resp. by RentaCar applet).
Security Properties. A security property is associated with each output variable. This property follows from the sufficient conditions defined in the previous section :
-Sresult: when a result is produced, the computed level of the result is dominated by the level of the interaction. -Smethod: when an external method is invoked, the computed level of parameters is dominated by the security level of this interaction. -Sf ield: when an attribute is modified, the computed level of the attribute is dominated by the security level of this attribute.
In order to verify these properties, we have to compute all the evolutions of the program. First, for each instruction i and each object o of the program, we For Java byte code, we take into account, in addition to output and input objects defined previously, the operand stack, the program counter and other objects that will be given in the next section. For example, an instruction such as iadd computes the sum of the two integers at the top of the stack, pops these integers and pushes the result of the addition. If the current instruction at program location i is iadd, then the set dep(i, o t ), where o t is the top of the stack at time t, includes objects representing the top of the stack and its predecessor at time t − 1 and object pc t−1 . The definition of dep for each instruction of the subset of the JavaCard byte code we have taken into account is defined in the first appendix.
Verification of Hypotheses 1 and 2. We have access to the computed level of objects by means of the sets of syntactical dependencies dep(i, o t ). But we have to ensure that the hypotheses used to define the sufficient conditions are satisfied. The first hypothesis is trivially true because byte code instructions are deterministic. However, we must take care to include indirect dependencies in dep(i, o t ). For example, a conditional instruction such as if can give two different values to the program counter depending on the the value on top of the stack. To satisfy hypothesis 1, it is thus necessary to include the top of the stack at time t − 1 into the set dep(if, pc t ). The second hypothesis is also satisfied because each Java byte code instruction corresponds to one abstract byte code instruction that manipulates levels instead of values. We can thus associate with each sequence of instruction of a concrete evolution a sequence of instructions that corresponds to an abstract evolution. This abstract evolution associates with each object its computed level except for the program counter that keeps the same value as in the concrete evolution, which satisfies the condition of hypothesis 2.
Assume-Guarantee verification. Even if it is sufficient to verify the security properties on abstract evolutions where the value domain for variables is small, model checkers such as SMV cannot always handle call graphs with a large number of methods. Consequently we have decided to decompose the analysis.
We propose an assume-guarantee discipline that allows to verify a set of methods locally on each applet even if the methods call methods in other applets through shared interfaces (see figure 6 ). For instance, method update of applet Air France calls method getBalance of RentaCar, we will analyse both methods separately. We check that the Smethod property holds for the update method of the Air France applet: the level of parameters of the getBalance method invocation is dominated by the level of this interaction (i.e. RC + AF ). And we assume that RC + AF is the level of the result of this method invocation. When we analyse the getBalance method in the RentaCar applet, we will check that the Sresult property holds: the level of the result of this method is dominated by the level of the interaction and we will assume that RC + AF is the level of the parameters of the getBalance method. We adopt the same discipline for the attributes inside an applet. When an attribute is read, we assume that its level is the security level that was associated with it. When the attribute is modified, we check that the new level is dominated by the security level of this attribute. This assume-guarantee discipline inside an applet allows to verify only a subset of methods of an applet at a time (not the whole set of methods of this applet).
Thanks to this decomposition principle, it is possible to focus the analysis on the new applet that the card issuer wants to download on the cards. If the policy is unchanged there is no need to analyze again the already existing applets because levels associated with input and output objects will not change. If the security policy changes the security level associated with some input or output objects then only methods of already existing applets that use these objects should be checked again.
Local Analysis Technique
Our method to verify the security property on the application byte code is based on three elements:
-abstraction: following [3] we abstract all values of variables by computed levels; -sufficient condition: we verify an invariant that is a sufficient condition of the security property; -model checking: we verify this invariant by model checking (SMV).
We consider a set of methods at a time. Our approach uses the modularity capabilities of SMV: it first consists in building an SMV module that abstracts a method byte code for each method, then to build a main module that contains instances of each of these method abstraction modules and describes the interconnections between these modules. We begin by briefly presenting SMV, then we explain how we build a module for each method, we describe the main module and finally the properties. We illustrate the approach on the logFull example presented above that involves the analysis of methods logF ull, update and askF orT ransactions. The full SMV model is presented in appendix 2.
SMV. The model checker we use is SMV, from Cadence Labs 3 . We only give here a brief presentation of the specification language. The interested reader is referred to [13] for more information.
Basic types in SMV are booleans, enumerated and integer intervals. Arrays can also be used (several dimension arrays if necessary). An SMV specification is a set of equations describing evolution of variable values. Two main ways exist to specify the value of a variable: either we give its value at each time instant variable := expression, or we give the initial value and the next value init(variable) := expr1; next(variable) := expr2. A particularity of SMV is that non deterministic assignments are possible, for example b := {0,1} specifies that b takes either value 0 or value 1. Remark : ";" does not represent sequence in SMV, it is only a separator.
SMV specifications are organised in modules. A module gathers declarations and assignments and, like a procedure, has got input and output parameters. A module can thus be instanciated several times, with different parameters.
The main control structures are:
-if: if (c) x:=expr1 else x:= expr2, that can also be written x := c ? expr1 : expr2 ; This expression means that equations of <stmt1> are used for all cases where variables are not defined by <stmt2>.
Properties can be defined that have to be satisfied by every execution of the system, using assert. Properties are linear temporal logic formulas, temporal operators are G (always), F (eventually), X (next) et U (until). Assertions can be labeled, for example Prop1: assert G(x=0). One assertion can also be used as hypothesis to prove another property by using the statement using ... prove : using Prop1 prove Prop2.
Method abstraction module. We illustrate our technique on a simplified version of Air France update() method. This method directly invokes method getBalance of the RentaCar applet and updates the extendedbalance field.
Method void update() 0 aload_0 1 invokespecial 179 <Method int getBalance()> 4 istore_1 5 aload_0 6 dup 7 getfield 220 <Field int extendedbalance> 10 iload_1 11 iadd 12 putfield 220 <Field int extendedbalance> 15 return
Abstraction. The update() byte code abstraction is modelled by an SMV module. This module has got parameters (which are instantiated in the main module):
-active is an input of the module, it is a boolean that is true when the method is active (as we consider several methods, we have to say which one is effectively executing); -context is a boolean representing the context level of the caller; -param is an array containing the levels of the parameters of the method (only one here, the object to which the method is applied, this); -f ield is an array containing the levels of the attributes used by the method (only one here extendedbalance); -method is an array containing the levels of the results of the external methods invoked by the update method (only one here getBalance). -public is a boolean representing the bottom in the lattice of levels.
The module also involves the following variables: The values of the variables are abstracted into levels. Levels are defined in a module called Levels in such a way that a level is represented by a boolean; least upper bound is modelled by disjunction, sharing by conjunction and implication encodes the fact that a level is dominated by another.
Hence the types of abstracted variables are boolean or array of booleans. We do not abstract the value of the program counter that gives the sequencing of instructions, we keep unchanged the value of the stack pointer that gives the index of the first empty slot. The byte code execution starts at program location -1. Initially, the stack is empty.
init(pc):= -1; init(stckP):= 1; for (i=0; i< 3; i=i+1) {init(stck[i]) := public; } The control loop defines the value of the program counter and of the current instruction. It is an almost direct translation of the Java byte code. When pc is equal to -2 then the execution is finished and the current instruction is nop that does nothing. As in [8] , each instruction we consider models various instructions of the Java byte code. For instance, as we do not care about the type of memory and stack locations, instruction load i represents Java instructions (aload i, iload i, lload i,...). Similarly, the op instruction models all the binary operations as (iadd, ladd, iand, ior, ...). Instruction start initializes the memory location with the method parameters and the level lpc with the context level of the caller context.
Although methods in the Electronic Purse case study tend to be rather short, the value domain of the pc variable is generally the larger domain in the SMV model we generate. As a large value domain can be a source of state explosion for model checkers, it is interesting to reduce it. We consider that the next value of pc is pc + 1 (except of course in the case of conditional or jump instructions). In this example, the domain of pc is -2..9 that is smaller that the original domain 0..15. The following section of the SMV model describes the effect of the instructions on the variables. The instructions compute levels for each variable. The load instruction pushes the level of a memory location on the stack, the store instruction pops the top of the stack and stores the least upper bound of this level and lpc in a memory location. The least upper bound of levels l 1 and l 2 is modelled by the disjunction of two levels l 1 ∨ l 2 . The dup instruction duplicates on the stack the top of the stack. The op instruction computes the least upper bound of the levels of the two first locations of the stack. The invoke instruction pops from the stack the parameter and pushes onto the stack the result of this method invocation. Instruction getf ield pushes on the top of the stack the level of attribute extendedbalance. And, finally, instruction putf ield pops from the stack the level of attribute extendedbalance. No conditional instruction such as ifne, tableswitch ... occurs in the example presented above. The behaviour of these instructions is to jump at various locations of the program depending on the value of the top of the stack. As this value is replaced by a level, the abstract program cannot decide precisely which is the new value of the program counter. So an SMV non-deterministic assignment is used to state that there are several possible values for pc (generally pc + 1 or the target location of the conditional instruction).
It is well known that conditional instructions introduce a dependency on the condition. This dependency is taken into account by means of the lpc variable. When a conditional instruction is encountered, lpc is modified and takes as new value the least upper bound of its current level and of the condition level. As each modified variable depends on lpc, we keep trace of the implicit dependency between variables modified in the scope of a conditional instruction and the condition.
lpc should also get back to its old level when going out of the conditional. However, there is no explicit endif in the byte code and it can be difficult to compute the end of a conditional. We will not handle this problem here but a solution is proposed in [2] .
Main module. We have an SMV module for the update method. We can build in a similar way a module for the askF orT ransaction method and for the logF ull method. We also have a module Levels. The SMV main module is composed of two parts: the first part manages the connections between methods (definition of the active method, parameter passing); the second one assigns levels to attributes and interactions.
The main module includes an instance of each of the method abstraction modules and one instance of the level module. To describe the call graph, we use the method call stack calls and its associated stack pointer prev. The main module contains a set of equations that define the value of active according to the call graph. Initially, the active method is logF ull. When askF orT ransactions is invoked (m_lgf.ByteCode=invoke_108), method askF orT ransactions becomes active. When it terminates (m_aft.pc=-1), logF ull becomes active again. When update is invoked (m_lgf.ByteCode=invoke_55) method update becomes active. When this method terminates (m_ud.pc=-1), logF ull is active until the end.
When logF ull invokes askF orT ransactions or update, it involves parameter passing between methods. In the example, there is only one parameter in each case(this), so it is sufficient to copy the top of logFull stack into the parameter array of the invoked method. We also transfer the context level of the caller to the invoked method by copying lpc in the context parameter. It now remains to assign levels to attributes and interactions. In the example, we have two attributes with level AF : balance (225) which is a parameter of askF orT ransactions, and extendedbalance (220) which is a parameter of update; and two interactions: getBalance (179) between Air France and RentaCar (so its level is AF + RC), parameter of askF orT ransactions, and getT ransaction (163) between Air France and Purse (so its level is AF + P ), parameter of update. In our boolean encoding of levels, l1 + l2 is expressed by L.l 1 &L.l 2 .
Invariant. We explained above how to compute a level for each variable. We also explained what security level we assigned to attributes and interactions. The invariant we verify is the sufficient condition we previously described: the computed level of each output is always dominated by its security level.
For the update method we should check two properties: one to verifiy that the interaction between update and getBalance is correct and the other one to check that update correctly uses attribute extendedbalance. Property Smethod 179 means that, whenever the current instruction is the invocation of method getBalance, then the level of the transmitted parameters (the least upper bound of lpc and the top of the stack) is dominated by the level of the interaction (the value of method[0] is AF +RC). In our boolean encoding of levels, l 1 is dominated by l 2 if L.l1 implies L.l2. Property Sf ield 220 means that, whenever the current instruction is the modification of field extendedbalance, then the level of the new value (the least upper bound of lpc and the top of the stack) is dominated by the level of the attribute (the value of field[0] is AF ).
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:
For the initial method (here logF ull), we also have to verify the Sresult property which means that whenever the method is finished the level of the return value (the least upper bound of the top of the stack and the level of pc) is dominated by the level of the interaction AF + P . As logF ull does not return any value, the property to be checked is just that the level lpc is domintaed by the level of the interaction.
Analysis.
Once we have the abstract model and the invariant, we model check the invariant properties on the model using SMV. If the property does not hold the model checker produces a counter-model that represents an execution of the byte code leading to a state where the property is violated.
A security problem is detected when checking property Smethod 179 of method update. Indeed, the logF ull interaction between purse and Air France has AF + P level. The getBalance channel has AF + RC level and we detect that the invocation of the getBalance method depends on the invocation of the logF ull method. There is thus an illicit dependency from a variable of level AF + P to an object of level AF + RC (cf figure 7) . A tool has been implemented which automates the production of SMV models. The automatization is relatively straightforward provided that preliminary treatments are made to prepare the model construction, such as construction of the call graph, method name resolution, subroutine elimination. The tool also handles exceptions. The tool and associated treatments are described in [2] .
The electronic purse case study was completely analysed using this tool (132 SMV models, 421 properties). A fourth of the properties are verified within 5 seconds and 90 % are verified in less than 10 minutes (see [2] for a more detailed description of the experiments). The electronic purse application we considered is a big application with respect to smart card memory size limitations, it is more complex than current applets developed by Gemplus for customers. Hence we think we have demonstrated the ability of our technique to verify real world applications.
Related Work and Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach for the certification of applets that are to be loaded on a Javacard. The security checks we propose are complementary to the security functions already present on the card. The applet firewall controls the interaction between two applets, while our analysis has a more global view and is able to detect illicit transitive information flow between several applets. Our approach is also complementary with the kind of verification described in [19] . The authors model application isolation requirements in a multi-application smart-card context. They are interested in showing that operating system functions enforce secure interaction between applets but their approach does not deal with transitive informations flows. Hence the model described in [19] could provide the basis of a formal model of applet isolation enforced by the JavaCard applet firewall.
Our approach is based on a security policy that defines how information is authorized to flow between applets. The policy associates levels with applet attributes and method invocations. We used the secure dependency property to control information flows between applets. We showed that to check this property it was sufficient to prove a set of security invariants on a finite model of the applets. We proposed to abstract the Java byte-code by replacing actual values with security levels. We used the standard model checker SMV to verify the security invariants. A tool has been implemented that automates the production of SMV models. However, a complete automatization is hardly possible: an interaction with the user is needed for the definition of security policy and level assignments.
A lot of work has been going on about the analysis of security properties of Java byte code. The major part of this work is concerned with properties verified by SUN byte code verifier like correct typing, no stack overflow, etc. These properties are not directly connected with the information flow control property we have based our work on. Among this work, two kinds of approaches can be distinguished depending on the technique used for the verification. Most of the approaches are based on static analysis techniques, particularly type systems [4, 21] . One approach has used model checking (with SMV) to specify the correct typing of Java byte code [18] . We also based our approach on model checking tools because they tend to be more generic and expressive than type checking algorithms. This allowed us to obtain results faster because we did not have to implement a particular type checking algorithm. This should also enable us to perform experiments with other security policies and properties without developing new verification algorithms.
Recently, several researchers investigated the static analysis of information flow properties quite similar to our secure dependency property but, to our knowledge, none of them applied their work on Java byte-code. Girard et alter [9] defined a type system to check that a program written in a subset of the C language does not transfer High level information in Low level variables. In [5] , the typing relation was related to the secure dependency property. Volpano and Smith [20] proposed a type system with a similar objective for a language that includes threads. They relate their typing relation to the non-interference property. The secure dependency property was compared with non-interference in [1] .
Myers and Liskov [17] propose a technique to analyze information flows of imperative programs (the case of Java is taken into account in [16] ) where variables are associated with security levels. In this context, a security level contains for each possible creator of the value a set of authorized observers. A comparison relation is defined that authorizes information to flow from l 1 to l 2 whenever for all creators listed in l 1 , the set of authorized observers in l 2 is contained in the set of authorized observers in l 2 . As in our approach, has a lattice structure so the level associated with the result of a binary operation is the least upper bound of the levels associated with that operation parameters. One of the interesting features of this policy is the declassify operation that allows creators to modify levels. The authors propose an almost linear constraint solving algorithm to verify that the level associated with each value is dominated by the level associated with each variable it may affect. This algorithm is more efficient than the model checking based verification but it is restricted to one kind of security property.
We think that our approach could deal with other kind of security properties with very limited modifications. In [10] the authors propose an automatic method for verifying that an implementation using local security checks satisfies a global security property. Their approach is focused on control flow properties such as Java Virtual Machine stack inspection. A Java program is modelled by its call stack traces, the only instructions of interest are: method invocation, method return and security checks. Methods are tagged with properties such as their origin, electronic signature status, etc. The authors propose to state security properties as Linear Time Temporal logic formulae. For instance an interesting JavaCard security property could be: once a method has been invoked by the terminal no internal applet method should be invoked until the user is authenticated. As our byte code models contain the call graph stacks (variable calls), and as temporal operator U ntil is defined in SMV we should be able to state and verify the previous property in our framework.
Finally, it might be interesting to investigate whether the results obtained in the case of JavaCard could be useful in the broader setting of Java hostile applets.
with a Pacap abstract instruction. A Pacap abstract instruction is a representative for all Java byte code instructions with similar syntactical dependencies. For instance, the op Pacap instruction represents all binary operations such as iadd, isub, ior,... as for all these instructions, the top of the stack at t + 1 depends of the first and second value in the stack at t and all other objects are unchanged. In the table we note *add for all the Java byte code instructions matching with this expression such as iadd, fadd. In the load a and store a Pacap instructions, a denotes a memory location address. In the invoke i, getstatic i, getfield i, putfield i and putstatic i Pacap instructions, i is an attribute or method identifier. Several Java byte code instructions are not taken into account because they are not supported by JavaCard virtual machines. For instance, as there is no thread in JavaCard, instructions monitorenter and monitorexit are not represented in the Pacap byte code. We also assume that due to some preliminary transformations on the Java source code or byte code some instructions will not be used. For instance, if we suppose that sub-routines calls are replaced by the sub-routine codes we need not take into account instructions jsr, ret and jsr w. In [2] , we explain transformations that can be performed in order to treat exceptions (instruction athrow), arrays (instructions iaload, iastore) or object creation (instruction new). 
